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Socialism is, at minimum, a twin enterprise. It is at once a critique of capitalism 
and an argument for moving beyond capitalism to a world in which social relationships 
are governed by the principle, “From each according to ability, to each according to 
need.” Put another way, socialism is first a critical appraisal of the actually-existing 
political economy of capitalism and second, an argument for a particular kind of post-
capitalist world. Among others, G.A. Cohen has argued that under scientific socialism – 
as elaborated by Marx and Engels and perhaps more especially by Rosa Luxemburg – the 
two projects were united (Cohen 2001, 73-78; 100-115). The reason that the socialist 
critique of capitalism and the project for a socialist society were one and the same 
endeavour is that the socialist solution to capitalism was immanent in the historically 
unequal and exploitative class relationships that are at the heart of capitalism. Out of the 
successful revolutionary struggle of the majority working class against the dominance of 
the minority capitalist class would emerge an unprecedented moment, the beginning of 
human history. Rid of limiting reifications like “the economy” and “the market” and most 
importantly, of the unequal social relations underlying them, human beings would self-
consciously and democratically organize social relationships together. Democratic 
decision-making, in the best socialist variants, would no longer be confined to a narrow 
and artificially carved-out formally political realm but would also include the economic 
realm and other aspects of social life. This new socialist society would meet the particular 
needs of each human being, while sharing social burdens (Cohen 2008, 138), so enabling 
the fullest expression of human potential for each and all.  
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 For scientific socialists, there was, however, no need to argue for the socialist 
project, in the absolute, since it was an inevitable consequence of revolutionary class 
struggle emerging within capitalism. As Cohen observes (2001, 109), although Marx, 
Luxemburg and many less well known activists and authors made (and some continue to 
make) great personal sacrifices in the name of socialism, ostensibly these sacrifices were 
not over an uncertain future, but rather to speed along an inevitable, ultimately victorious 
revolutionary working class struggle (Cohen 1995, 3, 6).  Yet, if it is a certainty that 
capitalism will not last forever, anymore than feudalism or other modes of production in 
human history, it is not obvious that socialism, and specifically democratic socialism, will 
inevitably succeed capitalism. Cohen argues that in particular, there is no world-wide 
immiserated working class with nothing to lose that will emerge to carry out the socialist 
revolution (for instance, Cohen 1995, 7-9) and no ecological possibility of the 
superabundance that will make equality unproblematically attainable, since many wants 
cannot be met under the ecologically-necessary conditions of reduced consumption. If 
Marx and others in his wake elaborated a very helpful explanation of capitalism and a 
trenchant critique of capitalist injustice (or of objective exploitation, as Marx would have 
it) and if socialism remains a compelling political project, socialism is no longer an 
inevitability but simply one possible -- and possibly unlikely -- political future among 
others.  
  
Social Location and Socialist Theory 
 
 To explore the tension between the socialist critique of capitalism and socialism as 
a more just way of organizing social relationships, I look at the work of two scholars, 
sociologist Himani Bannerji1 and the late philosopher G.A. Cohen. G.A. Cohen’s work is 
the focus of the articles and research notes in this special issue, drawing on a Socialist 
Studies conference organized in 2010 by libertarian philosopher Jan Narveson, who 
contributes a comment on Cohen’s work and afterward to this issue. 
 Himani Bannerji and G.A. Cohen were born just one year apart, 1942 and 1941 
respectively. Each spent many formative years in Canada and each was an immigrant, 
Bannerji coming to Canada from Bengal, India and Cohen leaving Canada for Britain as a 
doctoral student. Both experienced discrimination and prejudice on ethnic/racial 
grounds. Both explicitly characterize themselves as committed to socialist struggles, so 
that both operate at least partly on the margins of academia, where Marxism has been of 
                                                        
1 Due to technical difficulties with the audio file, we regret we are unable to publish the interview of 
Bannerji conducted by Sherene Razack, herself a devastating critic of the interlocking systems of injustice 
that are capitalism, patriarchy and racism (see, for instance Razack 2008), originally planned for this issue. 
We hope to be able to publish it in the next volume in some form. 
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declining significance over the last several decades -- if far from dead, as their own lively 
work, among others, attests.  
 Yet, despite these generational, biographical and political affinities, Cohen and 
Bannerji espouse quite different socialisms. I will suggest these have their roots in their 
respective social locations. As Bannerji would insist, biographical differences are not only 
about personality and talent, family and culture. Rather, more often than not, they are an 
expression of power, and of how power operates to include and to exclude. Indeed, they 
are even about how power operates to create certain socially meaningful and 
consequential categories of actors in the first place. In her own words, for example, 
Bannerji became a “woman of colour” within the settler state of Canada. And of course, 
“power” is never generic, but always occurs in historically-specific forms, for instance, as 
class relations. 
 In other words, biography is always-also about the personal experience of political 
power, the ways that, as Bannerji reminds us, “the political is personal,” to invert the well-
known feminist slogan (Bannerji 2000, 88). In this way, the account that I offer of 
Bannerji and Cohen’s intellectual biographies emphasizes the weight of history on the 
ways their respective socialist engagements developed.  
  
Himani Bannerji: Sociology from the Margins 
 
 Himani Bannerji is Bengali-Canadian. Following tenured professorship in India, 
she was for a long time a precarious academic in Canada before finally becoming a 
tenured professor at York University, in the Department of Sociology. As noted, Bannerji 
emphasizes how, within the context of London, England and later in Canada, she became 
an immigrant, ethnic, a “visible minority” within a white supremacist nation 
conceptualized in terms of the two warring “solitudes” of the colonizers, English and 
French (Bannerji, 2000, 88). Within the patriarchal, imperialist capitalist configuration of 
the Canadian state, with its commonsensical racialization that interpellates people of 
colour as such (2000, 65), Bannerji became an implicitly inferior “other” against an 
universalized white male norm, whether the referent is the French or English-speaking 
colonizer.  
 Of course, Bannerji’s personal entwinement in colonial relations did not begin 
with her arrival in Britain and Canada. Already in India, she had been enrolled in a school 
where English was the language of instruction and Shakespeare the centre of a wholly 
British canon, taught to Bengalis in a self-conscious effort to create an English-speaking 
Bengali elite thoroughly tied into the colonial imaginary (Bannerji 1995, 55-56). It was, 
however, as an immigrant, that Bannerji first felt the full force of the painful and 
dehumanizing process of becoming an inferior other – and this across all spheres of life, 
including academia and in the realm of feminist politics.  
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 Taking English literature classes at the University of Toronto, for instance, 
Bannerji felt her presence in and contributions to the class were, at best, irrelevant to the 
professor and other students, at worst, an intrusion on the ‘normal’ convivial course of 
class discussion (Bannerji 1995, 57-58). Her life experiences were made to seem 
completely irrelevant to and were entirely absent from course materials, and her person 
was made thoroughly alien through numerous small remarks, as with eminent professors 
who asked if she felt cold wearing a sari in the Canadian winters. Indeed, she felt so 
thoroughly alienated that she discontinued her PhD studies and only took up her 
university career again many years later. This time, thanks to writers like Frantz Fanon, 
Audre Lorde and Dorothy E. Smith, she was armed with the beginning of a reflexive, 
critical awareness of the political structures underpinning her feelings of isolation as an 
immigrant woman of colour (Bannerji 1995, 60). 
 In her re-started academic career, Bannerji sought to become, not simply an 
“object” produced by the relations of ruling, but a political subject. She set herself the task 
of writing and teaching in order to lay bare and resist relations of domination, so laying 
the path for a new, feminist, anti-racist socialist world (1995, 106), rooted in what 
Bannerji calls “an actively revolutionary knowledge” (1995, 81). Inevitably, as one of the 
first non-white woman academics in Canada, this was a lonely business. Bannerji’s allies 
were less often flesh and blood partners and more often texts written by far-flung black, 
Indigenous and other nonwhite women engaged in a similar political and theoretical 
struggle. Moreover, being armed with a reflexive awareness of the practical ways that 
oppression operates within academia, did not make the experience of oppression any less 
painful in everyday practice. Bannerji writes that within the classroom, she was constantly 
reminded that she was an exception to the university rule: “As a body type I am meant for 
another kind of work—but nonetheless I am in the classroom”, exercising a kind of 
authority as a professor (Bannerji 1995, 61). Both as a consequence and symptom of this, 
she has had to continually establish her status as an equal before her students and to 
colleagues, an often exhausting business. At times, white students and colleagues, 
including those explicitly committed to feminist and historical materialist approaches, 
sought to empathize or express white guilt. Apart from the very rare exception of feminist 
scholar Dorothy E. Smith, however, her colleagues were not prepared to engage in 
systematic analyses of the ways their own teaching, research and collegial relationships 
are implicated in racist and patriarchal relationships (Bannerji 1995, 111). 
 More often than not, the public, professional academic experience of teaching and 
research was painful, even enraging. But within the classroom, pain and rage could not be 
directly expressed. Instead, Bannerji coped by splitting her “professional” self from her 
personal self. The personal self submitted to the violent gaze of mostly white students and 
colleagues, a gaze simultaneously reflecting and enacting “centuries of ‘knowing’ of 
existential and historical racism” (Bannerji 1995, 102). The professional self transformed 
that experience into analysis, one that stretched from the classroom to the history of the 
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world. Thus, Bannerji teaches and writes in order to make clear the connections between, 
for instance, the social violence of the classroom gaze she experienced and the racist 
ideologies of colonizers who need(ed) to justify the violent takeover of “brown” peoples 
and their lands, so that these could be reorganized within colonial class relationships 
(1995, 99-120).  
 Within academia, Bannerji’s marginality was accentuated by her Marxism. It is 
not difficult to imagine how her officially precarious university status, throughout much 
of her career, could be justified by so-called objective standards of academic excellence. 
Thus, publication in mainstream journals, using mainstream theories less disturbing to 
existing power relationships than Marxism is necessary for scholarly advancement (Smith 
2004, 37-44). Moreover, it is telling that Bannerji feels compelled to specify her own anti-
racist and feminist orientation within mainstream Marxism. Like most academic theories, 
mainstream Marxism remains premised on the wholly unjustified assumption that it is 
possible to talk about actually-existing social relationships in capitalism whilst abstracting 
from -- that is, ignoring --the simultaneously racialized and gendered but also ableist and 
heterosexist nature of social life. As if, writes Bannerji, “nothing much is to be learned 
about the nature of economic, social and political organization…by studying lives or 
concerns of women of colour” (1995, 43). By insisting on the centrality of the 
simultaneous experiences of race, gender and class oppressions within the historically 
specific configuration of world capitalism, Bannerji seeks to challenge a canon that 
institutionalizes these as “objectively” minor dynamics – but the immediate price is to be 
dismissed as a scholar concerned with “minor” issues. 
 This status as inferior outsider was and is not confined to academia.  Mainstream 
feminist politics, Bannerji writes, ironically sought to silence women of colour and 
working class women, all while insisting on giving “women” a public voice (1995, 41-54). 
And, there was and is the everyday racism. Riding with her daughter on the subway in 
Toronto, for instance, fellow passengers watched as she struggled to free her child from 
being jammed in the doors, all the while making comments about “you people” not 
knowing how to properly ride the metro system (1995, 13). In short, Bannerji’s early, 
precarious existence within academia and Canada cannot be separated from her social 
existence as a non-white woman in a white settler nation.  
 Yet, if objectively caught in relations of domination and oppression, Bannerji is 
not simply a victim of those relations. As she writes about herself, “I am object, but also 
subject” (1995, 104). Bannerji did find both literary and flesh and blood allies in academia 
and beyond, in her struggles, and she has continued to engage in projects of pedagogical 
but also political resistance. Moreover, if her work is firmly committed to critique, it is 
likewise insistent about the possibility and necessity of revolutionary, emancipatory social 
transformation. Finally, Bannerji is a poet, too. Like her sociology, her poetry – what 
might be referred to as “resistance poetry” (Armstrong 2001, xvii)-- speaks both of the 
violence of many contemporary social relationships and of the possibility of transcending 
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that violence: she writes of broken birds who are, nonetheless, also phoenixes rising 
(Alvarez 2007, 18). 
   
G.A.Cohen: Success at the Centre 
 
 G.A. Cohen’s childhood was spent in working-class Jewish Montreal. He grew up 
in a Russian émigré family committed to communism. Like Bannerji, Cohen experienced 
ethnic hatred as well as the sometimes frightening marginality and even criminalization 
associated with active socialist politics. The left-wing and bilingual Yiddish-English 
primary school he attended was closed following a raid by Quebec’s ‘Anti-Red’ brigade 
(Cohen 2001, 27-30). Following this, Cohen assiduously hid his communist convictions 
from his classmates until his teenage years, when he was accidentally politically ‘outed’ 
and realized to some surprise that being identified as communist had a certain cachet 
among his adolescent friends. Whatever the rebellious allure this affiliation gave him in 
the eyes of his classmates, however, Cohen remained all-too aware of the brutality of anti-
communist activities by the Quebec police and he writes of the fear he felt as a child and 
young adolescent when carrying out semi-legal errands for his communist parents and 
their friends.  
 Following the closure of his primary school, Cohen attended English protestant 
schools, partly in order to avoid the more explicit anti-Semitism at the French Catholic 
ones. Inevitably, this left him exposed to what he refers to as ‘genteel’ Protestant anti-
Semitism (Cohen 2001, 28). As a Jewish child growing up in Montreal, this included 
formal discrimination, including signs at public and private establishments forbidding 
entry to Jews and discriminatory entrance requirements at McGill University that meant 
Jewish students had to outperform Christians in order to be accepted. It also meant 
exposure – and the everpresent fear of exposure -- to other forms of everyday, informal 
anti-Semitism, including insults shouted out in the streets and barbs aimed at Jewish 
students by their teachers. As Cohen remarks, it only took the very occasional anti-
Semitic slur yelled out in the street to instil a long-lasting feeling of vulnerability (2001, 
34).  
 Cohen writes that these experiences of discrimination enhanced his own sense of 
Jewishness, as well as feelings of vulnerability, exclusion and even self-loathing (2001, 34-
37). Remembering a male teacher who revelled in anti-Semitic asides in the classroom, for 
instance, Cohen describes the destructive ways that deference to the authority represented 
by such a teacher meant that, “you have a kind of deference to his views that Jews are not 
quite human, or that they have all too many of the less agreeable human characteristics, 
and that doesn’t help you to respect yourself” (Cohen 2001, 37). In the same book, he 
insists on “how damaging racism is to the self-respect of its victims” (188). The “big wide 
6
COBURN: Thinking About Class, Race, Gender  
non-communist world”, (Cohen, 1995, 247) as Cohen refers to it, was not necessarily a 
friendly and too often a hostile, place. 
 In spite of the ambient, often vicious anti-communism and anti-Semitism of his 
Montreal youth, Cohen succeeded in undergraduate studies at McGill University. Cohen 
offers this assessment of his survival of anti-Semitism in his youth: “I experienced anti-
Semitic attitudes as a Jewish child in Montréal, but the consequences of that for us were 
not very severe, since, unlike many other victims of racism, we Jews had assets (not least 
ones of culturally induced self-confidence) that made the ambient anti-Semitism 
relatively ineffectual with respect to our life chances” (Cohen 2008, 367).  Cohen went on 
to complete his doctoral studies at Oxford; he had also been accepted into the doctoral 
programme at Harvard, but declined. Subsequently, he became faculty at University 
College, London, where he worked for twenty-two years, before becoming Chichele 
Professor of Social and Political Theory, in 1985, so returning to Oxford at All Souls 
College. In short, by mainstream definitions, G.A. Cohen had a very successful university 
career, firmly at the academic centre of an old imperial power. 
 Nonetheless, success was not unmarked by continuing experiences of 
discrimination and marginality. Michael Rosen, for example, writes that  eyebrows were 
raised to see a Marxist at All Souls (Rosen 2010, 13). In his writing, Cohen is forthright 
about the anti-Semitism of contemporary Britain (2001, 38), although he suggests that in 
his early academic career in Britain anti-Semitism was so muted that he could not identify 
with British Jews, who were simultaneously more religious and more assimilated than he 
felt. (Nor were they Yiddish speaking Russian émigrés, which was Cohen’s own Jewish 
inheritance). Although Cohen does not talk about the experience of being an academic 
with working class roots, it is not implausible – if far from certain --that this created some 
sense of dissonance and ambivalent sense of belonging. Cohen was well-known for his 
informality and lack of inhibitions: who knows how this irreverence might be connected 
to his working class origins and experiences of anti-Semitic discrimination and exclusion? 
 Finally, Cohen may also have suffered from material disadvantages, relative to 
other academics, as a consequence of his socialist orientation. Just over a decade ago, 
when he was already well-known, Cohen remarked that if, like most professors, he was 
relatively rich, he was also ‘quite poor, as professors go’ (Cohen 2001, 150, italics in 
original). Cohen is not forthcoming about why, writing about “various reasons that need 
not be laid out here” (150). Nonetheless, in the contemporary capitalist world and 
particularly given restraints on public funding of universities, professors of philosophy 
are likely to be less well remunerated compared to professors in – for instance – relatively 
better-endowed business departments, who are oriented to the practical workings of 
everyday market societies. Generally speaking, socialist philosophers are less well known 
and in demand compared with liberal superstars like Rawls, who owe their renown and 
enthusiastic acceptance partly to the fact that they espouse theories congenial to existing 
capitalist power relationships. Despite important networks of solidarity amongst many 
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left scholars, socialist professors’ ideological marginalization has disadvantageous 
material consequences, relative professors with more acceptable political leanings. 
 Yet, it seems clear that G.A. Cohen did not only benefit from Jewish solidarity, as 
he mentions above, in carving out his academic career. Rather, within contemporary 
capitalism, maleness and “whiteness” are nonproblematic -- or “transparent” to borrow 
Frantz Fanon’s term. Bannerji became a visible minority within the context of the 
imagined multicultural community of England and Canada, including within academia. 
In contrast, Cohen appears to have been more easily absorbed into mainstream academia 
in Oxford, England, despite his committed socialism and Jewishness. To paraphrase 
Bannerji, as a body type, Cohen’s white maleness is meant for the kind of work done in a 
university classroom -- particularly, it might be argued, in an Oxford classroom. As a 
consequence, Cohen’s status as a professor did not need to be constantly and repeatedly 
achieved, but was to a large extent already-acquired. The flip side of Bannerji’s exclusion 
and marginalization within academia as a racialized woman of colour is Cohen’s less-
difficult inclusion as a white man, possessing the automatic – and professorial -- 
authority that a particular (white, male) body represents.2  
 Both Bannerji, the sociologist, and G.A. Cohen, the philosopher, make important 
contributions to socialism as a critique of capitalism and socialism as a more just way of 
organizing social life. Not surprisingly, however, given their distinct social locations, 
Himani Bannerji and G.A. develop different socialist critiques of capitalism and 
arguments for a socialist future, as a more just way of organizing human relationships. 
Their approaches are not always complementary. Moreover, there are uneven dangers in 
their respective contributions to the socialist critique and the socialist social project.  
  
Himani Bannerji and the Sociology of Socialism 
  
 To twist a phrase of Cohen’s, Bannerji has been concerned with the “hard factual 
carapace” (Cohen 1995, 6) of capitalist social relationships as they are lived, both 
historically and in a variety of national settings, including India, Canada and elsewhere. 
Bannerji insists that any clear-eyed assessment of actually-existing capitalist relations 
must recognize the ways that race, gender and class oppressions are inextricably meshed 
together in social experience. “Race, gender and class” are too often recited in this way: in 
serial but also rote fashion, with the artificial separation marked by the commas between                                                         
2 This maleness and perceived whiteness is not a “privilege” that Cohen could simply and single-handedly 
renounce. It is not as if gender and race is a matter of personal choice. Rather, they are a consequence of 
social relationships – that of course, Cohen also participated in – that render some individuals, like Cohen, 
male and white in the same movement that others become women and “minorities”, while simultaneously 
positioning men and whites as superior and femaleness and “otherness” as inferior. Of course, if Cohen 
could not renounce white privilege, he could analyse and critique racist relations – and he sometimes did 
(for instance, Cohen 2008, 345-50), within his more general argument for socialist justice. 
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each word. In fact, the experience of race, gender and class are always “all together” and 
“all at once” (Bannerji 2005, 144). A human being is not first, a woman, then, a person of 
colour, and third, working class. Rather, she is always all-at-once: race, gender and class 
are inseparable as “coffee and milk” once they have been mixed up together (Bannerji 
2005, 149). As Bannerji observes, the women who mistook her for the cleaning woman of 
a building she was in, had no trouble simultaneously thinking about race, gender and 
class (Bannerji 1995, 12). Theory cannot do less, if it does not want to engage in a 
misleading fragmentation of actual experience. The problem is at once conceptual and 
political: conceptual since it reifies as separate objective “fragments” what are unified 
social experiences (Bannerji 2005: 146) and political since this fragmentation is then 
reproduced in strong distinctions between communities and movements, that then have 
difficulty accomplishing unified political action. 
 Bannerji often starts from experience, including her own, to explore actually-
existing relations under capitalism. This approach is based on the observation, already 
cited earlier, that the “political is personal”. Inevitably, we are enmeshed in the politics – 
the political economy -- of the world, which is nothing more than relations among 
human beings. But, there is nothing transparent about experience (Bannerji 1995, 55-98). 
Rather, processes of domination and exclusion are normally hidden through the 
commonsense sense of everyday ideologies that rewrite these relationships of oppression 
as natural, inevitable even desirable for most people. Experience must be interpreted -- 
and interpreting in counterhegemonic ways is anything but spontaneous. Bannerji was 
not born an anti-racist feminist socialist, but become one. Similarly, it was only after 
encountering the writings of Fanon, Lorde, Smith and others that Bannerji was able to 
“see” many years later that her feelings of loneliness and irrelevance as a university 
student were a product of racism (Bannerji 1995, 56). Racism here is interpreted 
materially – as a pragmatic, social fact, existing in everyday, often institutionalized 
relationships that, for instance, define what “matters” within the classroom as the history 
and stories of white, European bourgeois people. In such a reading, personal experience is 
analytically explainable only within the understanding of a worldwide context of the 
historically specific configuration of capitalist imperialism that brings people together in 
definite, unequal class relationships, a configuration that is legitimated by ideas that 
racialize both whites and brown people, whilst positing whites as superior to others. 
 Bannerji observes that hegemonic ideas are not uniform and homogenous. On the 
contrary, they are frequently contradictory, because they shift pragmatically to fit with the 
interests of dominant classes in particular historical moments and situations (Bannerji 
2001, 48). For instance, in the colonial imaginary of the past and present, brown men are 
variously construed as authoritarian, barbaric, violent and effete. Brown women are then 
seen as requiring rescue from enlightened white Europeans, although this stereotype of 
brown women as victims is not stable either. Yet, Bannerji insists, in investigating ideas, it 
is not enough to examine the specific, practical and contradictory content of hegemonic 
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ideas, although of course this is vital. (Too often, Bannerji argues, this description of 
ideological content is where postmodern theorists, with their emphasis on the discursive 
and the intertextual, stop). Rather, it is necessary to understand the epistemology behind 
the ideological content, the methods through which knowledge is produced (Bannerji 
2001, 20-31). Ideas and culture are always-also social, that is, created in distinct, material 
relationships and conditions; the “knower” does not exist outside of the social 
relationships studied, but instead is located within them. 
 In her book Inventing Subjects (2001), for instance, Bannerji explores how “India” 
is produced as an object of knowledge within specific circumstances. William Jones, 
author of a once-authoritative text of India, was at the time of writing, the head of the 
colonial justice system. His aim, as administrator, was to seek to create “a just and 
benevolent rule over India in keeping with its own nature” (2001, 35), in Bannerji’s 
words. Thus, Jones’ India is a fixed, ancient society which has, however, been corrupted 
by weak, submissive but potentially powerfully deceptive “native” actors, including 
deliberately unreliable translators. (Hence Jones’s insistence on the importance of 
learning local languages, to better survey potentially subversive native go-betweens 
(Bannerji 2001, 41). The role of the British rulers, in the justice system in particular, is 
then justified as the “restoration” of authentic ancient law to India, as written up in 
centuries-old scripts, against the dissembling natives (Bannerji 2001, 40-41; 48). British 
colonial rule, resistance by the colonized and the colonial relationship itself disappear in 
Jones account (Bannerji 2001, 36) . Instead the dominant story – underwritten by Jones 
own “authoritative” social and cultural history of India -- is that of the problem of 
applying authentic Indian law to Indians. As this example suggests, ideas have content, 
which matters. Here, for instance, is the more or less familiar trope of an ancient 
civilization that has been degraded by its own inhabitants and now requires rescue from 
civilized interpreters, who are in fact colonizers. But that content is only explainable via 
thorough examination of how and why ideas are produced (Bannerji 2001, 28), in this 
case, as expert knowledge, by and ultimately for the colonizers --but in the name of the 
wellbeing on the colonized. 
  Shifting her critical gaze to Canada, Bannerji demolishes the argument that 
official “multicultural” policy in Canada represents a liberatory or progressive 
programme. In her book, Dark Side of the Nation (2000), Bannerji unmasks 
multiculturalism as an ideology premised on the English or French colonial state 
paternalistically “granting” recognition to racialized others defined as if they are 
segmented and internally culturally homogenous communities. At best, the state 
positions itself in a “patron-client” relationship, with rewards granted on the basis of 
state-evaluated “good conduct” (Bannerji 2000, 116). At the same time, this emphasis on 
static, robust cultures means that the problems caused by racist, exclusionary practices 
may be attributed to inadequate, pathological, even criminal “cultures” among 
“minorities”. In this way, the oppressed become responsible for their own domination: 
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when young black men are shot by police, the explanation is that young black men are 
violent, the consequence of growing up in an impoverished, inferior culture (Bannerji 
2000, 116).  
 In fact, however, multiculturalism is not primarily about its ostensible object, 
culture. Rather, multiculturalism is about the construction of shared “community” 
identities based on bodies and skin colour. In this way, it is multiculturalism that creates 
“visible minorities” (Bannerji 2000, 31; 104; 11-112; 116). Brown bodies become visible in 
contrast to normative hence “invisible” white ones. At the same time, nonwhites are 
labelled minorities because then their demands, in any case restricted to very limited 
power sharing, can be legitimately ignored in favour of what is implicitly redefined as 
“majority” white politics, whatever the actual numbers. In practice, an important function 
of official multiculturalism is to write out the possibilities for genuine politics. Questions 
of power, of racism, of workers’ rights, of family reunification for migrant workers 
(Bannerji 2000, 44), are all erased in a unique focus that is supposedly “culture” but that 
is, in fact, about reifying racialized communities. This characterization of important 
swathes of the Canadian population, including migrant workers and others, undermines 
possibilities for political action based on the “genuine contradictions in our society” 
(Bannerji 2000, 120). The horizontal potential for struggles based upon the reality of 
unequal social relations – struggles against racism, against violence against women, 
against poverty, against heterosexism (Bannerji 2000, 119)-- is lost in the official 
“recognition” of supposedly internally homogenous, but separate and fragmented, ethnic 
communities.  
 As Bannerji insists, however, her critique of historically specific kinds of 
oppression that are an everyday part of actually-existing capitalist relationships is not the 
end point of her work (1995, 83-89). Rather, she is interested in a detailed description and 
explanation of how relations of inequality work and why they take the historically specific 
forms they do, in order to better consider how they may be subject to revolutionary 
transformation. Analyses matter, Bannerji argues, because they imply different politics of 
resistance for social actors who are never simply victims of the relations of domination in 
which they act, but also potentially revolutionary actors. In particular, Bannerji points out 
that the failure to conceptualize race, gender and class inclusively comes at significant 
political cost to socialist movements, who lose support from much of the working class 
when race and gender are dismissed as irrelevant or as “distracting” from class issues 
(Bannerji 2005, 147). Symmetrical problems exist for movements of racial justice that 
ignore class as a “white” issue or among women who argue that the fact of being a woman 
is of primordial significance “over and above” considerations of class and race. Capitalist 
injustice succeeds in part because it has successfully fragmented what is, in fact, the 
unified social experience of class-gender-race (Bannerji 2005, 155-157). Socialist justice 
will only succeed insofar as it based on recognition that class-gender-and-racial justice, 
can only advance altogether and all at once.  
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 Ultimately, for Bannerji, the critique of capitalist social relations throws into relief 
the urgency of creating radically new ways of living. The political goal is new social 
relationships, ones that allow human beings to freely and joyfully re-create themselves 
and the world around them (Bannerji 2001, 203). Underpinning this is what Bannerji 
refers to as an “ethical” commitment, a universal humanist affirmation that begins with 
an understanding of herself as a being in the world and “presuming the same for others” 
(Bannerji 1995, 13). In a world that assumes only white men’s messages are of universal 
relevance, it bears repeating that Bannerji’s socialist aspiration is not for a particular 
segment of humanity. She does not write exclusively for nonwhite women. Instead, her 
socialist aspiration is a universal one, for revolutionary transformation towards a more 
just social world for all. Fanon, too, emphasized his own history and identity as a ‘nègre’ 
while simultaneously affirming: “Je me sens une âme aussi vaste que le monde” -- I feel in 
myself a soul as immense as the world (Fanon 2011, 176). Bannerji claims no less. 
 
G.A. Cohen and the Moral Philosophy of Socialism 
 
 G.A. Cohen, an analytical philosopher, offered a life-long defence of socialism, 
although the kind of socialism he defended changed over the years, as did the way he 
went about defending it. The book that made Cohen’s name was Karl Marx’s Theory of 
History: A Defence (2000), a collection of essays that takes the central arguments set forth 
by Marx and examines them, piece by piece, taking care, as Cohen explains, to be precise 
of statement and rigorous in argument (Cohen 2000, xviii). Against looser and more 
romantic representations of Marxism – what Cohen sometimes memorably referred to as 
“bullshit Marxism” -- analytical philosophers are bound, Cohen writes, to ask themselves: 
“precisely what does this sentence contribute to the developing exposition or argument, 
and is it true?” (Cohen 2000, xxii, italics in original). In this way, Cohen sought to subject 
Marxism to the “rule of reason” (Cohen 2000, xxiv). His “defence”, which includes a 
thoroughgoing scrutiny of all major Marxist concepts, from class to the means of 
production to fetishism to the relationship between base and superstructure, ultimately 
led Cohen to reject some key Marxist arguments. Notably, this included the rejection of 
determinist theses about the inevitability of socialism. As I noted in the introduction, the 
inevitability thesis depends in Cohen’s view upon untenable arguments about the 
emergence of a large, world-wide, impoverished working class with nothing to lose and 
on the equally untenable prospect of material abundance without natural, ecological 
limits.  
 What was left of his Marxist commitment, Cohen argued, was “the foci and 
preoccupations, the aspirations and values, of traditional Marxism” (Cohen 2000, xxiv). 
In particular, Cohen argued that the main questions that remain to inspire contemporary 
historical materialists, to paraphrase a summary of his own work by Tom Mayer, are: 
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What do we, as socialists, want? Why do we want it, especially as contrasted with 
capitalism? And finally, how can we achieve it, given the improbability of a working class-
led socialist revolution? (Cohen 2000, xxv). Arguably, Cohen’s entire career was spent 
seeking to answer these questions. 
 By his later years, Cohen had entirely shed his commitment to historical 
materialism, insofar as this can be interpreted as requiring the development of “bold 
explanatory theses about history in general and capitalism in particular” (Cohen 1995,6). 
Increasingly, Cohen’s writing was devoted to what he characterized as a typical normative 
political philosophical endeavour: the search for “timeless truths” and specifically for 
ultimate, “fact-insensitive” principles of socialist justice. Cohen justified this normative 
turn on the grounds that since socialist revolution is not inevitable, the only way to bring 
about a more just socialist world is through rigorously argued moral appeals. Specifically, 
Cohen maintains that bringing about socialism demands widespread acceptance of 
egalitarian commitments based on a new “ethos”, which he describes as a “structure of 
responses” informing individual motivations (Cohen, 2001, 128). The socialist ethos is 
rooted in (the realizable possibility of) a sense of shared community or fraternity among 
people who see each other in non-instrumental terms, as fellows to whom they must 
justify their own way of living (Cohen 2008,15). For Cohen, socialism is a normative 
political project, informed by the rigorous establishment of coherent arguments on the 
basis of key principles – notably a commitment to egalitarianism -- that direct human 
responses within social life conceived as community.  
 In defence of socialism, both as a desirable way of organizing social life and as a 
feasible political possibility (Cohen 2009), Cohen attacked some of the stoutest defenders 
of the principles underlying capitalism or said to underlie capitalism. In Self-ownership, 
Freedom and Equality (1995), for instance, he wrote against the libertarian Nozick. There, 
he suggested that a better name for libertarians of Nozick’s ilk would be “entitlement 
theorist” (Cohen 1995, 72), since their concern is less with freedoms than with rights to 
property: after all, the rights of property owners frequently decrease the freedom of 
nonowners, but this is not what exercises libertarians like Nozick (Cohen 1995, 60). 
Cohen argues that among entitlement theorists, Nozick, at least, makes patently false 
claims about things coming into the world with entitlements already attached to them – 
so conveniently forgetting not only the continuing existence of unowned commons, like 
the air and pavement, but also the historical fact that at a particular moment things 
privately unowned became privately owned (Cohen 1995, 73). And, Cohen goes into 
considerable detail to refute Nozick on this point, among others, arguing that there is no 
conceivable, legitimate way that “full liberal private property” could be formed, that is not 
simply theft and that does not leave others worse off than if the acquisition had been left 
privately unowned (Cohen 1995, 77-78).  
 Typically for Cohen, this argument against a libertarian defence of private 
property ownership becomes the occasion for revisiting and refining “traditional” 
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socialist claims. In this instance, Cohen argues that Marxists sometimes sound like 
entitlement theorists, when they argue that one of the reasons that workers’ justly revolt 
against the capitalist system is because their labour entitles them to the products of their 
labour – and yet, part of this labour is appropriated, stolen, by capitalists as profit. Cohen 
observes that this Marxist entitlement proposition, grounded in the labour theory of 
value, is not compatible with another Marxist value: distribution to each according to 
needs (Cohen 1995, 153). He concludes that socialists better let go of the idea of 
entitlement to the product of one’s own labour, if they are truly committed to the 
contradictory piece of socialism that is most worth holding onto: organizing social life so 
that each receives what is necessary to lead a decent, fulfilled life and shares social 
burdens.  
 In subsequent books (see, for instance, Cohen 2008), Cohen tackled the liberal 
philosophy elaborated by Rawls, in particular, his well-known “difference” principle. 
According to this principle, inequalities are just insofar as they are necessary to improve 
the lot of the least-well off. But, this Rawlsian principle suffers from a number of failings, 
considered both in itself and within the broader framework of justice that Rawls erects 
around this principle. For instance, Cohen argues that Rawls has an untenable vision of 
the just society, based on conformity to just coercive “basic structures” particularly the 
law (Cohen 200!, 132-140). This Rawlsian vision, Cohen maintains, artificially separates 
out “basic structures” like law from other formally “noncoercive” structures, like the 
family, that – in fact -- critically shape life chances. It doesn’t make sense, Cohen argues, 
to maintain that a law is unjust because it is entrenches male dominance, while ignoring 
the ways that patriarchal attitudes practically entrench gender inequalities within families, 
in everything from housework to the education of children (Cohen 2008, 137). As Cohen 
puts its, “To the extent that we care about coercive structure because it is fateful with 
regard to benefits and burdens, we must care equally about the ethos that sustains gender 
inequality and inegalitarian incentives” (Cohen 2008, 138).   
 For a society to be just, Cohen argues, there must be much broader considerations 
than those allowed by Rawls in his exclusive focus on coercive “basic structures”. For 
Cohen, social justice must prevail in at least four distinct realms. These are (1) the basic 
formally coercive structures, like law, which use preventative barriers and deterrent 
penalties to prevent certain behaviours (Cohen 2008, 144); (2) other formally 
“noncoercive” structures, like the family, where sanctions typically take on forms like 
criticism, disapproval, ostracism, and even in extreme cases, violence; (3) the prevailing 
social “ethos”, understood a “set of sentiments and attitudes” that informs normal 
practices (Cohen 2008, 144); and (4) individual choice, where it is recognized that 
individuals do exercise choice but within contexts of heavy social conditioning and 
potentially high costs for deviating from dominant practices (Cohen 2008 141; 144). Only 
when justice prevails across all four of these domains, Cohen argues, can a society be said 
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to be just. Yet, in terms of their importance for revolutionary social change, not all of 
these domains are equal. 
 Across his later work, Cohen maintains that it is change in the social ethos that 
informs broad social transformation. For instance, Cohen suggests, an early ecologist may 
seem like a social freak and the ecological practices she carries out may seem especially 
burdensome. But, as ecological consciousness spreads, the ecologist increasingly appears 
to be quite ordinary, the practices of reducing consumption, recycling and similar 
activities become “normal” and the sense of burden associated with carrying them out 
decreases (Cohen 2008, 142). The ecological social “ethos” becomes the new norm, 
radically changing everyday social practices and relations as a consequence, which then 
reinforce the ecological ethos. Of course, it is this conviction about the importance of 
social ethos to transformative social change that motivates much of Cohen’s work, 
although in his later writings Cohen stresses that he is also interested in justice “as such”, 
for him a separate matter from the actual practice of (socialist) justice (Cohen 2008, 306-
307).   
 In his accessible short essay Why Not Socialism? (2009), for instance, Cohen seeks 
to make the content of the socialist ethos explicit, explain why it is desirable and convince 
readers of its feasibility. He begins with his often-used example of the camping trip.  Of 
course, as Cohen acknowledges, camping trips  -- which Cohen himself did not especially 
favour as a pastime (Cohen 2009, 10)-- have some special characteristics. They are 
typically made up of small, mostly self-selected groups, where there is relatively easy 
mutual surveillance. Nonetheless, the camping trip is suggestive, insofar as it represents a 
common experience during which socialist values of community and egalitarianism seem 
“natural” and naturally desirable. At the same time, during a camping trip, market values 
and practices look strange and even reprehensible: few would countenance one camper 
eating all the fish, just because she owned the fishing rod. In short, the camping trip 
makes socialist values look less exotic and more feasible, all while highlighting the ways 
that normal capitalist values may come to seem, at best, morally suspect as a way of 
organizing social relationships. Through reasoned argument and examples like this one, 
Cohen seeks to convince readers of the reasonableness and desirability of socialist values 
of “community and (egalitarian) justice” (Cohen 2009, 80, my insertion). Why not 
socialism in all aspects of social life, including the economic realm currently governed by 
an acquisitive, inegalitarian ethos?  
 In this view, individuals have a critical responsibility that they arguably did not 
under Marx’ historical materialism, with its inevitable unfolding of history. Indeed, 
Cohen writes quite early on that “behaviours of individuals are always where the action is, 
in the final analysis” (Cohen 2000, xxiv). But, this does not mean that socialism is a 
politics that happens only in the minds of individuals or even in the minds of many 
individuals living together in communities. It is not enough to have isolated individuals – 
no matter how numerous -- convinced of the rightness and possibility of achieving 
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socialist values. Rather, to be successful against a capitalist system that is largely “self-
sustaining” socialists require “the power of organized politics” (Cohen 2009, 81). 
Socialism will only ever come about through the collective struggle of human beings. 
These are not, however, Marx’ historical actors: they are not necessarily working class and 
even if they are, they are not only engaged in an “objective” effort to improve the lot of 
their class and reduce the suffering attendant to capitalist inequalities. Rather, they are 
motivated by community-oriented and egalitarian values. These socialist values that 
cannot be assumed, or taken for granted, but must be rigorously thought out and then 
vigorously defended. In the end, socialism is a fundamentally moral endeavour. 
 
The Future of Socialism 
 
 Both separately and together, Bannerji and Cohen suggest that the contemporary 
capitalist world is, for far too many, intolerable and unjust. This implies the need for 
radical transformation. At the same time, it is because they use the vantage point of a 
more just, socialist world, that they are able to denaturalize and morally condemn what 
appears to be the commonsensical, inevitable and even desirable ways of organizing social 
life that are typical within capitalism. As Bannerji observes, it is because she writes with a 
vision of “resistance and revolution” that she is able to locate herself and understand her 
experiences and those of others: “How would I get out of the dead end of a violent ‘now’, 
if I did not know what was possible?” (Bannerji 1995, 10).  
 Nonetheless, their respective emphases are different. Bannerji is most acute in her 
critique of the multiple aspect of actually-existing capitalist oppressions, simultaneously 
encompassing race-gender-class, as well as in her discussions of the sometimes 
contradictory and partial efforts of dominated actors to overcome these. Cohen offers 
detailed critiques of the principles said to underlie capitalist market societies, but spends 
less time analysing how capitalist social relationships actually work in practice. Much 
more energy is used to convince readers, both sympathetic and not, of the moral value 
and intellectual coherence of the socialist project, as a particular kind of egalitarian 
philosophy. Arguably, Bannerji focuses on the problems of capitalism; while Cohen offers 
detailed reasons to support socialism. 
 There are dangers associated with a more exclusive emphasis on one or the other 
aspect of socialist theory. In particular, socialism as critique risks, in some variants, 
becoming a paralysing overdeterminism, so that the current injustices of capitalism 
become social practices seemingly destined to be reproduced, even if they no longer 
appear natural nor morally justifiable. On the other hand, socialism as prescription, if 
unhinged from an appreciation of the dynamics of actually existing capitalism, risks both 
the reasonable charge of utopianism and the somewhat different problem of a false 
universalism that, in fact, reproduces ‘commonsense’ justifications or naturalizations of 
historically-specific oppressions.  
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 At best, socialist theories address both elements, of critique and of prescription, 
keeping them in creative tension. Thus, Bannerji is careful to emphasize that her critique 
of capitalism, in its various historically specific incarnations, has implications for socialist 
practice. In particular, she calls for a historical materialist analysis that does not shy away 
from the complexity and specifics of oppressions within world capitalism. This means 
moving away from either/or formulations to more socially-accurate – and therefore more 
potently mobilizing – theories of social change. In her own words: 
  
there is enough ground in Marx’ works to create social movements that 
need not choose between culture, economy, and society or ‘race,’ class, 
and gender to organize politics of social revolution. Going beyond 
gestures of intersectionality, coalition, and social cohesion, Marxists 
have recourse to a non-fragmentary understanding of the social that 
could change the world as we know it (Bannerji 2005, 157). 
 
 For those developing Cohen’s work, Cohen has already largely refuted the charge of 
“utopianism” in his strenuous attention to the details and coherence of the socialist 
project. His “thick” and detailed defence of socialist principles, in itself, makes the 
socialist project more present and credible. 
 However, Cohen can be criticized for engaging in a debate with “universal” 
aspirations with participants who are anything but. The frequency in Cohen’s citations of 
other white, male analytical philosophers -- Elster, Roemer, sociologist E.O.Wright and so 
on, for the Marxist side, but then also Nozick, Rawls, Narveson and so on, for the 
opposition -- does suggest there is a problem with Cohen’s socialist philosophy. This 
mirrors contemporary historical materialist debates, which too often reflect this kind of 
non-arbitrary exclusiveness among participants. Since it is clearly not obvious to 
nonwhite scholars and activists why Cohen’s approach matters – there is no dialogue with 
such scholars– there is a burden on those following in Cohen’s footsteps to consider how 
links can be made. If it remains a minority, white man’s game, socialism has no future. 
Within academia and philosophy departments, as well as beyond them, there needs to be 
outreach to explain why socialism, its values of community and egalitarianism, matter for 
nonwhite men and women in the dominated classes. For such outreach to be meaningful, 
many socialists need to begin to educate themselves: this means socialists must take 
seriously the huge literature by black, Indigenous and other “minority” men and women 
scholars on social injustice and social, if not always socialist, justice.  
 Cohen does write about the injuries of racism and he talks about the neglected 
importance of identity to human beings, within traditional Marxism (on this last point 
see, for instance, Cohen 2000, 341-363). These are promising entries to a bridge for 
dialogue with socialist scholars, including those in other disciplines, that -- like Bannerji -
- take race and gender seriously. The aim here is not to blame, but to mobilize and to 
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offer analysis, in order to begin to build socialism beyond its current narrow base to 
create a society-wide socialist movement. Surely a socialist ethos of “community and 
egalitarianism” requires no less than a concerted effort to broaden the socialist 
community and have a socialist debate among equals, who are not all of the same 
minority (white male) background. 
  We live in times when there supposedly “is no alternative” to capitalism, despite 
repeated crises and their devastating effects for the dominated classes. In this 
environment, it is already a meaningful expression of resistance to proclaim, as Bannerji 
and Cohen do, that there is a possible and desirable alternative: socialism. The challenge 
ahead is to make the socialist possibility relevant – not to a small minority – but to each 
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